Three Essays on the Economics of the Catholic Church
Benjamin Bauer
Advisor: Peter T. Leeson, PhD, Department of Economics
Committee Members: Christopher Coyne, Jonathan Schulz
Online Location, Zoom, https://gmu.zoom.us/j/98803110975?pwd=W4ht1GdFF4wSvgRCMbtBjmIBfTGh7x.1
July 15, 2026, 12:00 PM to 02:00 PM
Abstract:
This dissertation examines the role of Catholic religious institutions in shaping economic and political outcomes from the early Middle Ages to the present. Using rational choice theory, it analyzes how Catholic doctrine and institutional arrangements evolved in response to political and economic incentives and how, in turn, they produced efficient outcomes.
Chapter one, Competition Within the Church: Market Entry and the Rise of Traditional Catholicism, considers the effects of a same denomination competitor (the Society of Saint Pius X) entering a previously monopolistic market for Latin-rite religious services. The paper provides the first measure of interdenominational competition, as well as insight into the provision of religious goods in the wake of Vatican II. We exploit a moratorium on the provision of the old Mass to develop an IV, disentangling the effect of SSPX chapels of Catholic Masses. We find that the presence of SSPX chapels significantly increases the availability of diocesan Traditionalist Masses, particularly on Sunday when attendance is required. We also find that the effect is strongest on the local level and has intensified over time. There are several key takeaways from this paper: (1) In pluralistic societies, religious organizations will be most successful if they offer a higher degree of diversity in forms of celebration, (2) religious competition, even within denominations, can have positive effects on consumers, (3) religious freedom remains significant in improving the quality of religious services within a given society.
Chapter Two, Papal Elections, uses rational choice theory to analyze papal elections. We develop a theory of how self-interested rulers generate a credible oracle. Medieval rulers frequently submitted disputes to papal adjudication despite the pope’s lack of coercive power. A pope could resolve such disputes by coordinating rulers on peaceful outcomes, but only if rulers expected others to obey his rulings. Papal elections generated such compliance. By limiting unilateral capture, aggregating information about potential candidates, and generating common knowledge that the elected pope was broadly acceptable, papal elections produced an oracle capable of sustaining compliance among competing rulers. The theory predicts the content and timing of election reforms and explains why papal arbitration was most valuable under conditions of a broad balance of power. Evidence from papal elections, election reforms, and papal characteristics between the eleventh and eighteenth centuries supports these predictions.
Chapter Three, Relics and Early Medieval Landholding, develops a theory of monastic delegation to explain both the rapid expansion of medieval monasteries and the centrality of relics in early medieval Europe (c. 475–1000). Often land donations from kings to monks assigned formal property rights to relics, rather than to the monasteries that housed them. Why? This paper argues that relic cults functioned as contract-enforcement technology in a setting characterized by weak property rights. Kings faced a delegation dilemma. Granting land to powerful elites risked creating military rivals. However, assigning land to weak agents, such as monasteries, created incentives for predation, leading to reduced production. Relics resolved this dilemma by tying control of the land to the continuous performance of costly, publicly observable rituals. Failure to sustain these expenditures exposed monasteries to relic theft by rival religious communities. At the same time, ritual expenditure converted agricultural surplus into relationship-specific investments, reducing the stock of wealth available for the king to steal and increasing the costs associated with losing the relics. By linking property rights to relics, kings sustained high levels of output without creating rival agents. To evaluate this theory, I consider historical evidence from early medieval Francia and England and analyze English charter data. The results show that relic-holding monasteries received larger and higher-quality land endowments and were systematically positioned to facilitate monitoring by both kings and rival monks.