Cesar A Martinelli

Cesar A Martinelli

Cesar A Martinelli

Professor

Economic theory, game theory, political economy, experimental economics

Cesar Martinelli is a professor of economics at George Mason University.  He is a fellow of the Econometric Society and an Economic Theory fellow.  He  is currently an advisory editor for Games and Economic Behavior and a past editor for Social Choice and Welfare. He has published numerous articles in professional  journals, including The Review of Economic Studies, The Economic JournalTheoretical Economics, The Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, The Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Journal: MicroThe Journal of the European Economic Association, The International Economic Review, Economic Theory, European Economic Review, The Journal of Public Economics, Social Choice and Welfare, Public Choice, and others.  Before joining George Mason, he held faculty appointments at ITAM and at Carlos IIII University in Madrid.  He has been a visiting professor at the University of Chicago (2011) and a visiting assistant professor at the University of Rochester (1997-1998). He obtained a PhD in economics at UCLA in 1993 and a BA in social sciences (economics) at the Catholic University of Peru in 1987.

Current Research

Currently working on electoral accountability and corruption, evidence and experiments (with Janneth Leyva, Naila Sebastian), elections (with David Levine), search (with David Austen-Smith), price controls (with Edgar Castro and Hugo Diaz), market games in the lab (with Dan Houser, Thomas Stratmann, Weiwei Zheng, Jianxin Wang, Arthur Dolgopolov), political economy of media (with Jaideep Roy).

Selected Publications

Accountability and Grand Corruption, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol 14: 645–679 (2022)

Electoral Accountability and Responsive Democracy, with John Duggan, Economic Journal, vol. 130: 675–715 (2020)

Cheating and Incentives: Learning from a Policy Experiment, with Susan W. Parker, Ana Cristina Pérez-Gea, and Rodimiro Rodrigo, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, vol. 10: 298–325 (2018)

The Political Economy of Dynamic Elections: Accountability, Commitment and Responsiveness, with John Duggan, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 55: 916–984 (2017)

A Spatial Theory of Media Slant and Voter Choice, with John Duggan, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 78: 640–666 (2011) 

Expanded Publication List

Competition with Indivisibilities and Few Traders, with Jianxin Wang and Weiwei Zheng,
forthcoming in Experimental Economics

An Algebraic Approach to Revealed Preference, with Mikhail Freer, forthcoming in Economic Theory

Accountability and Grand Corruption, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol 14: 645–679 (2022)

Review of The Political Economy of Development: A Game Theoretic Approach by Robert H. Gates, Political Science Quarterly vol. 137: 413–414 (2022)

A Utility Representation Theorem for General Revealed Preference, with Mikhail Freer, Mathematical Social Sciences vol. 111: 68–76 (2021)

The History of Peru, with Marco Vega, in A Monetary and Fiscal History of Latin America, 1960–2017 (Juan Pablo Nicolini and Timothy J. Kehoe, eds.), University of Minnesota Press (2021)

Electoral Accountability and Responsive Democracy, with John Duggan, Economic Journal, vol. 130: 675–715 (2020)

Collective Experimentation: A Laboratory Study, with Mikhail Freer and Siyu Wang, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 175: 365–379 (2020)

Ignorance and Bias in Collective Decisions, with Alexander Elbittar, Andrei Gomberg, and Thomas R. Palfrey, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 174: 332–359 (2020)

Communication and Information in Games of Collective Decision, with Thomas R. Palfrey, Handbook of Experimental Game Theory (C. Monica Capra, Rachel Croson, Mary Rigdon, and Tanya Rosenblat eds.), Edward Elgar Publishing (2020)

The Economic Legacy of General Velasco: Long-Term Consequences of Interventionism, with Marco Vega, Economía (PUCP), vol. 42: 102–133 (2019)

Politics, Entertainment and Business: A Multisided Model of Media, with Alejandro Castañeda, Public Choice, vol. 174: 239–256 (2018)

Cheating and Incentives: Learning from a Policy Experiment, with Susan W. Parker, Ana Cristina Pérez-Gea, and Rodimiro Rodrigo, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, vol. 10: 298–325 (2018)

The Political Economy of Dynamic Elections: Accountability, Commitment and Responsiveness, with John Duggan, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 55: 916–984 (2017)

Oligarchy, Democracy and State Capacity, with Helios Herrera, Economic Theory, vol. 52: 165–186 (2017)

Information and Participation in Social Programs, with David Coady and Susan W. Parker, World Bank Economic Review, vol. 27: 149–170 (2017)

A Spatial Theory of Media Slant and Voter Choice, with John Duggan, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 78: 640–666 (2011)

Deception and Misreporting in a Social Program, with Susan W. Parker, Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 7: 886–908 (2011)

Bargaining over Public Goods, with Julio Dávila and Jan Eeckhout, Journal of Public Economic Theory, vol. 11: 927–945 (2009)

Policy Platforms, Campaign Spending and Voter Participation, with Helios Herrera and David K. Levine, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 92: 501–513 (2008)

Do School Subsidies Promote Human Capital Accumulation among the Poor?, with Susan W. Parker, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 110: 261–276 (2008)

Rational Ignorance and Voting Behavior, International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 35: 315–335 (2007)

When Are Stabilizations Delayed? Alesina-Drazen Revisited, with Raúl Escorza, European Economic Review, vol. 51: 1223–1245 (2007)

Group Formation and Voter Participation, with Helios Herrera, Theoretical Economics, vol. 1: 461–487 (2006)

Would Rational Voters Acquire Costly Information?, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 129: 225–251 (2006)

Anonymity in Large Societies, with Andrei Gomberg and Ricard Torres, Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25: 187–205 (2005)

Should Transfers to Poor Families be Conditional on School Attendance? A Household Bargaining Perspective, with Susan W. Parker, International Economic Review, vol. 44: 523–544 (2003)

Simple Plurality versus Plurality Runoff with Privately Informed Voters, Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19: 901–920 (2002)

Convergence Results for Unanimous Voting, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 105: 278–297 (2002)

Policy Reversals: Electoral Competition with Privately Informed Parties, with Akihiko Matsui, Journal of Public Economic Theory, vol. 4: 39–61 (2002) 

A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries, with John Duggan, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 37: 259–294 (2001) 

Elections with Privately Informed Parties and Voters, Public Choice, vol. 108: 147–167 (2001)

Reputation with Noisy Precommitment, with David K. Levine, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 78: 55–75 (1998)

Small Firms, Borrowing Constraints, and Reputation, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 33: 91–105 (1997)

Sequencing of Economic Reforms in the Presence of Political Constraints, with Mariano Tommasi, Economics & Politics, vol. 9: 115–131 (1997)

Education

1987 BA in Social Sciences (Economics), Catholic University of Peru

1991 MA in Economics, University of California, Los Angeles

1993 PhD in Economics, University of California, Los Angeles

Recent Presentations

“Razor-Thin Elections.” 5th ETH Zurich Workshop on Political Economy. 2022.

“Razor-Thin Elections.” David Austen-Smith retirement conference (Northwestern). 2022.

“Razor-Thin Elections.” Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare (Mexico). 2022.

“Accountability and Grand Corruption,” Public Choice Meetings. 2022.

“Corruption and Reciprocity,” APEE Meetings. 2022.

In the Media

Interviews about corruption and political campaigns in Peru:

Revista Caretas (December 2, 2019)

Diario El Comercio (November 28, 2019)

Cheating and Incentives: Learning from a Policy Experiment, with Susan W. Parker, Ana Cristina Pérez-Gea, and Rodimiro Rodrigo, featured in AEA Research Highlights (March 5, 2018)

Deception and Misreporting in a Social Program, with Susan W. Parker, featured in:

New York Times blog Freakonomics (June 23, 2008)

Radio program The Takeaway (June 24, 2008)

Dissertations Supervised

Artur Dolgopolov, Dynamic Games, Social Preferences, and Assignment Markets: Theory and Experiments (2020)

Weiwei Zheng, Three Essays on Market Institutions (2020)

Mikhail Freer, Essays on Preference Extensions (2017)